Archive for Rajasthan Politics

Civil Society and Democratization in India

This chapter is an attempt to understand the emergence of civil society in India as a response to the rolling back of the state from social welfare. The chapter begins with an overview of the recent challenges before Indian democracy and moves on to discuss how civil society organizations used the various traditional media like folk dance, popular songs, street plays and other popular methods to spread awareness and to bring development through the empowerment of common people. It argues that the macro and mainstream universalistic media and communication was unable to capture the fragmented realities and social problems of the rural life for which civil society called for a micro and particularistic media to address the issues in rural society. Through the example of Mazdoor Kishan Shakti Sangathan (MKSS) in Rajasthan, the chapter also discusses the role of civil society organizations in enhancing democratization, especially the Right to Information Act in ensuring good governance in society.

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Making Aid Work?

Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee (2007) Making Aid Work. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 170pp, £9.95, 978 0 262 02615 4

 

Abhijit Vinayak Banerjee’s Making Aid Work provides an excellent forum to discuss the problems engulfing international development aid. It argues that the ineffectiveness of foreign development aid is primarily due to “institutional laziness” (p.7). Banerjee argues that international donor agencies, NGOs and multilateral institutions do not pay much attention to the impact and “cost-effectiveness” (p.16) of a program and are often “unclear about what they should be pushing for” (p.21). Building on the drugs evaluation model, Banerjee argues that “randomized trials… are the simplest and best way of assessing the impact of a program” (p.10). Although “randomized trials are not perfect” (p.11), argues Banerjee, they provide “hard evidence” (p.113) and “spur[s] innovation by making it easy to see what works” (p.122).

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The problems of foreign aid, as recognized by Banerjee, have been universally agreed upon by several economists and policy makers. However, his arguments on lazy thinking and randomized experiments have received skeptical responses. Many have rejected his accusations that the international donors are not pursuing impact evaluation and cost-benefit analysis. Banerjee’s argument is very limited and ambiguous. His academic training in economics influences much of his thinking on macro level quantitative experimentation, ignoring the dynamics of power relations at the grassroots level. He also fails to explain the idea of randomized experiment in a clear manner. His emphasis on laziness (not filling up a form) that is grounded on a particular example from Pakistan does not really apply to regular NGO functioning. As Mick Moore has rightly argued, development agencies are “staffed and run by expressive intellectuals” who are “skilled in performing the key functions of the contemporary aid business: producing position papers and strategy documents and managing inter-agency coordination meetings” (p.43).

 

By placing the emphasis on institutions, Banerjee has failed to address the “politics” of development and international aid, which often has created a “culture of dependency” at the grassroots level. Banerjee is also unable to understand that the problem of foreign aid is not primarily due to “institutional laziness” but the result of a rationalized and active institutional effort to depoliticize development and to create what James Ferguson (1990) has called an “anti-politics machine”. Nevertheless, Banerjee’s arguments have generated numerous pertinent issues and discussions related to the aid regime. His concluding essay has brilliantly addressed the machine like character of development policy making. The structure of the book is innovative, although the forum discussions are regrettably brief. 

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This review has been published by Sarbeswar Sahoo in Political Studies Review, Vol. 7, No. 1, January 2009

 

 

 

Globalization, Social Welfare and Civil Society in India

Globalization is being understood differently by different people. Fukuyama (1992) has referred it as the “end of history”, which established democracy as “the only legitimate and viable alternative to an authoritarian regime of any kind” (Huntington, 1992, p. 58). Where as, political theorists like Ohmae (1995), considering the vulnerabilities of the nation-states, have pronounced the “end of the nation-state”. Though it remains as an empirical question to see whether nation-states have lost their significance or not, one thing is clear that the existing state-society relationship in developing countries have undergone metamorphosis due to the policies of liberalization, privatization and globalization.

 

 

Following a historical analysis of the state-society relationship in India, the paper seeks to analyze the effects of globalization on Indian civil society. It argues that civil society during the colonial and early post-colonial period remained confined to the English educated upper caste elites and the subaltern populations were excluded from the public sphere because of the virtues of modernity and the paternalistic policies of post-colonial state and ruling elites. The decline of the moderate state and the Congress system in mid-1970s and the policies of globalization and the rolling back of the welfare state in mid-1980s transformed the state-society relationship and brought incongruous implications for civil society in India. The apparatus of the state became pluralized and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and people’s movements emerged to take up issues affecting the lives of poor and marginalized.

 

The paper concludes that though globalization has radicalized civil society activism and expanded its sphere over the past few years, in the process, it has turned civil society into a site of increasing class war, widespread violence and growing unfreedom. If civil society has to achieve freedom, democracy and social justice, it needs to move beyond its middle class orientation and transform itself as a more inclusive and more right based sphere of political activism. 

 

 jcsw-sahoo

Riots in Rajasthan

He was on his house’s roof, when he heard people shouting and running for shelter towards their houses. “There is riot in the city” someone shouted. Abdul Ghani’s house was in the Keer Khera mohalla of Chittore Garh. He thought his house was safe, as he had enmity with none. There were two more houses in the mohalla which belonged to the Muslims.

Suddenly he saw a crowd of fanatic people shouting slogans against Muslims heading towards his house. Now he was a bit anxious, as he had an adolescent daughter. He rushed down and closed the main gate of his house and bolted it thoroughly. Then he called his wife and daughter to the inner room and closed it firmly. He heard the sound of breaking of the main gate and in no time the rioters were on the door of the inner room in which he had hidden himself with his daughter and wife. The door could not resist the bumping and it fell open. Abdul Ghani now gathered his whole courage and tried to stop the hooligans from entering the room but he was hit by a knife in his belly, again and again, till he fell unconscious. Now his wife Bismillah tried to defend her daughter but she was beaten by sticks so badly that she had multiple fractures. Now the girl was there, unprotected and afraid. They dragged her and brought out to the street. There were about 40 people who ripped her clothes to make her stark necked. The intention was obvious. A few people of the mohalla felt ashamed as the girl belonged to their locality. They came to her rescue and the girl was saved except for some bruises on her body.

The riot broke in the city on the day of Holi. It was not all of a sudden, but well designed by the communal forces. The Police and administration didn’t take any action for complete four hours. The miscreants burnt, ransacked and looted the shops of Muslims freely for four hours. The Police Control room happens to be only 30 feet away from the Dargah of Sufi saint Hazrat Chal-Phir Shah, where all the menace was going on and the rioters were selectively burning and looting the shops belonging to the Muslim community. Even if there had been a shop of a Hindu among the Muslim shops, it was evacuate sympathetically and then the Muslims’ shops were set afire. The shameless nuisance continued even after curfew was imposed in the city.

Though it is commendable on the part of the Police, that they prevented any direct clash between the communities, but just after gaining control, they started arresting innocent people from both sides in the name of `rapid action’ till the number reached to about 45. Most of the detainees had nothing to do with the riot. The actual culprits, against whom FIRs have been lodged with their names, are still roaming about fearlessly and threatening the victims, even after one and a half month. According to the local residents, the offenders belong to the ruling party BJP and are fully protected.

During this unfortunate riot, about 60 shops, belonging to the Muslims were burnet, damaged or looted. According to the survey done by the administration, the loss amounted to Rs. 63 lakhs, but according to the local people, it amounts to about Rs. 85 lakhs to One Crore. Till now only 8 persons have been paid Rs. 50,000/- each and 49 have been offered Rs. 2000/- to 5000/- in lieu of their damaged properties worth lakhs of Rupees, what a joke? Really the communal forces must be rejoicing on the success of their plan to pull down theMuslims economically. Most of the victims have refused to accept such a meager help from the government.

The District Chittore Garh of Rajasthan has been in the clutches of the fascist and communal forces since a year. Recently in the month of December, 2007, on the very next day of Eidul Azha, 6 villages of Kapasan Tehsil of the district faced fierce riots in which several acres of fields with the crop either awaiting to reap already reaped and dumped there, were set ablaze, 19 tube wells were destroyed, hundreds of meters of PVC pipes were burnt, a tractor and a motor cycle were set on fire as well as quintals of fodder and manure. Here too is the same story. FIR was lodged against 51 people, but not a
single was arrested from among the chief culprits who are threatening the plaintiffs and amusing that you can do nothing against us.

Recently a delegation of Rajasthan Muslim Forum (a united forum of the Muslim organizations of the state) headed by Er. Muhammad Salim (State President JIH and member Forum) has visited the affected areas of the district. The villagers of Raghunath Pura, Umand, Hathiyana etc., informed the delegation that the culprits are enjoying the shield provided by the ruling party. They also complained against the District Collector P. L. Agrawal, Kapasan Tehsildar Himmat Singh and sub-section officer Manveer Singh Atri of being communal and biased against the Muslim Community and said that due to these officers the culprits could not be nabbed till now.

Here, (Kapasan Tehsil) also, the compensation amount being given to the sufferers is very small which they have denied to accept. Tehsildar Himmat Singh is reportedly forcing them to accept the amount and threatening that they will be charged falsely with serious allegations if they refuse to take the compensation.

The overall situation is that the district is fully in the hold of the communal and fascist forces, who consider themselves above the law. They are pretty confident, that no action will be taken against them. Another tragedy is that the Opposition party Congress didn’t play any role in bringing the rioters behind the bars or in availing justice for the victims. Moreover, some members of the party were found to be indulged in the December 07 riots of the Kapasan Tehsil.

The Rajasthan Muslim Forum has demanded from the government to arrest the culprits without delay, release the innocent people, give away the appropriate compensations for the losses and take stern action against the officers who are guilty of saving the criminals and discriminating communally.

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@ Received from South Asia Contact Group on 11 May 2008

History and Community Honor: Protests against film Jodha Akbar

Last month (Jan 2008), one has witnessed the acts of breaking glass panes, disrupting the screening of film Jodha Akbar, as a part of protests by sections of Rajput and Khsatriaya community against this film. They claim that this film insults their community honor! Some Governments banned this film, the ban which eventually was lifted by the courts.

The arguments of those opposing the film are on the overt ground that film is not historically accurate, as per them Jodha was Akbar’s daughter in law not his wife. Many have powerfully asserted that the film is a dishonor to ‘our’ daughters and daughter in laws. As such the film is made on the backdrop of the life and times of Akbar, regarded by Amartya Sen as one of the two great emperors who happened to rule India. The film shows many a trends and patterns of the time, Akbar’s policy towards those following other faiths, his alliances with Rajputs and the development of Mughal Rajput syncretism. In addition it also portrays him as the ruler having great respect for other prevalent religious tradition here, Hinduism.

It is not that the theme of Akar-Jodha is being presented on the screen for the first time. The perception about Akbar-Jodha relationship has been immortalized by the all time classic film Mughal-e-Azam, whose primary focus was on love breaking the social hierarchies of master and slave. It incidentally showed Jodha-Akbar relationship also. The film was well received at that time and was a big hit all around. So why protests against it at this point of time. During last few decades the identity based politics and communal historiography has gripped the society. The rise of right wing politics all over the globe and here at home has given a serious set back to the concept of intercommunity harmony. The process of narrow identities getting dwarfed by the national and global identities has also faced a severe jolt. Currently the narrow, caste, religion identities are asserting up strongly.

The communal historiography which understands the history through the prism of religion has been brought in strongly by the RSS combine and it presents the Mughal period as the dark period of Indian history, depicting Muslim kings in the total negative light, as tyrants, as the one’s destroying temples, forcing conversions and violating the honor of the Hindu women. This film successfully breaks that mould brought in by communal ideology and poses a challenge to the edifice on which their politics is based.

In communal view of society the community honor is located in the bodies of women, ‘our’ women are to be protected from others and ‘their’ women are to be dishonored as a revenge of ‘their’ violating the honor of our women. This was seen in the Hindutva ideologues Savarkar’s criticism of Shivaji. Shivaji had sent back the daughter-in–law of Muslim Sbhedar of Kalyan, who was brought as a ‘gift’ to her, with full honors. Savarkar says that Shivaji as a true Hindu should have taken revenge by dishonoring that women.

The armies and the kings were plundering the wealth and women in medieval times. Armies doing the same, even today is being witnessed at various places. Also there were matrimonial alliances between kings across the borders of religion and nationality, like Chandragupta Mauraya marrying the daughter of Macedonian king, Samudragupta allying with daughters of many kings with whom he had political battles. So the overall tenor of the film is very much in tune with the spirit of the times being portrayed. The unsaid and unstated part of the protests is the discomfort due to the portrayal of phenomenon of Hindu princess marrying and then falling in love with a Muslim king! That’s where the catch lies. Under the pressure from current communal atmosphere, one observes that in the films currently being made, the ones’ dealing with the Hindu Muslim love, the girl is generally Muslim and boy a Hindu e.g., Veer zara, Gadar, Bombay and Henna. It is another matter that Muslim fundamentalists do raise their voice of protests in such cases.

History is a vast ocean of events. History is an arena which has been interpreted by the elements according to their political agendas. In the film under discussion it is sure that there was matrimonial alliance between Mughal kings and Rajput princesses, it is sure that Akbar did have Rajput wife/wives. It is also sure that the interaction of Hindu Muslim, Mughal Rajput cultures peaked in the times of Akbar and did maintain its tempo later also irrespective of the ruling kings being fanatic or tolerant. As such this film comes as a refreshing interpretation, very much needed in current times.

As such some of those presenting the past have been using history with two major fallacies. The first one relates to selection of the events for treatment. The demolition of temples by Mughal kings is taken up and their donations to Hindu temples are suppressed from the narratives. The real reason for temple destruction was for wealth and also it was symbol of victory. The communal narratives describe it in a way whereby a material phenomenon is presented as exclusively religious one. Similarly to force conversions of defeated kings/army, as an insult to the defeated one, is highlighted as a religious phenomenon not related to power equation. The amity between religions, as presented in Bhakti and Sufi traditions is bypassed. The harmony between religious communities is hidden and conflict between kings of different religions presented as clash between religions.

Interestingly the fundamentalist coming from both religions are uncomfortable with syncretic traditions and look down upon it. So the Maulana will tell that the Islam of Sufi tradition is not the real Islam and a Pandit will assert that Hinduism which absorbs things form Islam, the one of Bhakti, is not true Hinduism.

The second distortion pertains to the motivated interpretation for political purposes. The History introduced by British, communal historiography, was aimed to divide and rule so British propagated a view of History whereby Muslim Kings were demonized. While picking up this thread the novel, Somanth, by Kanhaiyalal Manikchand Munshi, played a major role in demonizing Mahmud Gazni and Muslims. It presented his forays to loot the temple as the one motivated by religious purpose alone, as an insult to Hindu religion.

Currently two such examples can be seen. One is the play Jaanata Raja on Shivaji, which presents Shivaji as the one bent to build a Hindu empire in opposition to the Mughal Empire. This creates again a severe communal mind set, as the battles of Shivaji against Hindu kings are by passed and the whole effort of his comes forward as an enterprise to build a Hindu kingdom, demonizing Muslims in the process. In another genre is the play Mee Nathram Boltoy, (This is Nathuram speaking), a play about the murder of Gandhi, by trained RSS pracharak (Preacher) Nathuram Godse. Here again Gandhi’s nationalism, secular democratic one, is shown as bane of Hindu nation and Gandhi’s ‘appeasement’ of Muslims is presented as the reason behind killing him.

History seems to be a multi edged phenomenon. On one hand we have events, and on the other interpretation. Which events to select and how to present is what a historian does. As noted Historian E.H.Carr points out same fish can be cooked in different ways depending on the skills of the cook and nature of spices used. The issue is not that whether Jodha was wife or daughter in law of Akbar, the issue is in identity based politics of current times, a Hindu woman’s love or marriage to a Muslim is not acceptable. The same applies to the similar event of the past, as past is being given the life in present. The fact is that the film shows Akbar as humane, considerate, tolerant etc., totally contrasting the view of Muslims being propagated by RSS combine, so it cannot pass.

One wishes such humane and tolerant look at history should not only be upheld but also propagated far and wide. That’s the only way to integrate the nation, and human society far that matter.

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Ram Puniyani, Issues in Secular Politics, March 2008

Rajasthan School Textbooks: Glorifying Brahminism, Invisibilising Oppressed Castes

Caste and caste-based discrimination are fundamental realities of Indian life. Almost three-fourths of India’s vast populations belong to castes condemned by the Brahminical religion as ‘low’, having suffered various forms of caste-related oppression for centuries at the hands of the so-called ‘casteshigh’. Yet, this basic fact is completely glossed over in Indian school textbooks, which barely mention the word ‘caste’ or, if they at all do so, glorify the caste system as a supposedly ideal system of division of labour. The ‘low’ castes are thus almost completely invisibilised in the textbooks as they are in almost every walk of life. Along with this, the Vedic or Aryan civilization and the Brahminical religion, which form the very basis of the ideology of caste, are glorified as the epitome of Indian, and, indeed, world, culture and as the bedrock of Indian national identity. Caste-based oppression is particularly rife in Rajasthan, a state where vestiges of feudalism are still very strongly rooted. Yet, social science textbooks prepared by the Rajasthan state educational authorities and used in government schools do not mention the fact at all. Instead, the textbooks glorify Aryan civilisation, the progenitor of caste oppression, presenting it as the ‘golden age’ of Indian history. None of the heroes mentioned in the books as role models for students is a ‘low’ caste. Instead, besides the few non-Hindu figures, they are all ‘high’ caste Hindus, particularly Brahmins, thusreinforcing the tendency to define Indian nationalism in strictly Brahminical terms. The textbooks also mention nothing at all about grovelling poverty and oppression so rife in India and, instead, present a picture of Indian society as a homogenous unit, bereft of caste and class contradictions.

The textbooks clearly identify Hinduism with Brahminism, completely ignoring the fact that there is no such thing as a single Hinduism. They also remain silent on the existence of several traditions, considered in some sense ‘Hindu’, that are definitely anti-Vedic and anti-Brahminical. Seeking to bring together all the different Hindu ‘religions’ under a single, homogenous Brahminical umbrella, the text meant for standard s ix students lays down what it considers to be an authoritative definition of ‘Hinduism’, one which is Vedic and Brahminical in essence. Thus, it says that despite the existence of multiple traditions (panths) ‘all the Hindu panths recognize the Vedas’, ignoring completely the numerous Dalit, Tribal and other non-Savarna traditions that not only do not recognize the Vedas but are also explicitly anti-Vedic. The chapter insists that the ‘Ramayana, Mahabharata and Gita are the main books of the Hindus’, ignoring the vast numbers of ‘Hindus’ who do not recognize these books as theirs as well as the incisive critiques of these texts by Dalit ideologues. It insists that the notion of ‘rebirth’ and ‘idol-worship’ are ‘important beliefs’ of the Hindus, ignoring the numerous ‘Hindu’ traditions that deny these. The standard nine textbook presents Ram and Krishna as ‘avatars’ who, it claims, ‘have most heavily influenced [sarvaddhik prabhavit] Indian lifestyle’, thus conflating Brahminical culture with Indian culture and also denying Dalit and Adivasi critiques of Ram and Krishna as upholders of caste and caste-based oppression. Naturally, there is no mention of Ram’s brutal slaying of the Shudra Shambhukh or Krishna declaring that the varna system was divinely ordained.

Brahminical or Vedic civilisation, which laid the basis of the caste system, is repeatedly referred to in the textbooks as the alleged foundation of Indian culture. Thus, the social science text for class six students declares, ‘The Vedas are the treasury of our culture’, assuming thereby that all Indians must necessarily subscribe to Vedic Hinduism in order to be ‘truly’ Indian. It talks of the Brahmin revivalist Shankaracharya, who played a key role in driving Buddhism out of India, as ‘spreading Indian culture’, by which, of course, is meant Brahminism. The social science studies text meant for students of Class nine has a lengthy chapter on the Vedic civilisation. Expectedly, Vedic culture is described in glowing terms. In line with Hindutva arguments, the authors of the book dismiss the claim that the Aryans were invaders (in order, perhaps, to underline the claim that only the Muslims and the Christian British invaded India) and argue that ‘according to new research India is now being recognised as the original home of the Aryans’. They refer to two obscure writers, Sampoornanand and Avinash Chandra Das (without providing any references to their writings), to press this claim and even to argue that the Aryans migrated from India to other countries and that they did not invade India! They refer to two well-known and hardcore Hindutva ideologues, Rajaram and David Frawley, to argue that the Vedic peoples were the progenitors of ‘an old global civilisation ‘ and that ‘it must be accepted as older than the Egyptian and Sumerian and other ancient civilisations’. The Vedic civilisation is, predictably, portrayed in the chapter in ideal terms, bearing no relation with actual history as numerous scholars, including Marxists and Ambedkarites, have pointed out. Thus, the class six text claims that the Vedas lay great stress ‘on morality and good values, such as helping the poor, the helpless, staying away from bad deeds and immorality and preach that the entire world is one family’. In the Vedic period, it claims, ‘these values were very apparent and people helped one another […] An important feature of Aryan culture was that everyone had mercy for all creatures’. Likewise, the standard nine text says that the Vedas ‘inspired humans to lead a life of simplicity and high thinking’. It argues that the Vedic Aryans selected their rulers democratically and that the main role of the kings was to protect their subjects. In this task they were assisted by Brahmin priests or purohits and army commanders. Denying the well-known fact that the Vedic Aryans ate beef and other forms of meat and consumed alcohol, it claims that they were vegetarians and teetotalers. The texts portray the Aryan caste system as a harmonious, non-oppressive and egalitarian form division of labour, completely contradicting what critical historians have argued. Thus, the standard nine text claims that Vedic society was based on a system of four varnas and that one’s varna was decided on the basis of one’s worth, not birth. It mentions in this regard the Rig Vedic hymn that speaks of the Brahmins, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas and Shudras as similar to different parts of the human body. These are presented as working together harmoniously without any contradiction or exploitation. The chapter does, however, mention, albeit only in passing, that in the later Vedic period, ‘in some places’ there is mention of the varna system being transformed into one based on ‘family’. Crucially, even here there is no mention of caste oppression which is repeatedly attested to in all the Brahminical texts. The chapter then goes on to a discussion of Brahminical Hinduism, praising it as the veritable epitome of ecumenism. ‘Hinduism believes in tolerance for all humanity’, it says, conveniently overlooking the stern rules that virtually all the Brahminical Hindu texts lay down for the ‘low’ castes. ‘The Upanishads speak of happiness of all creatures’, it goes on, without mentioning the cruel oppression of the ‘low’ castes in the same scriptural tradition.

‘Hinduism talks of the entire world as being one family’, it claims, glossing over the fact that Hinduism has condemned the vast majority of the Indian people to sub-human status. It insists that Hinduism ‘gave direction to world peace’, overlooking the numerous stories of violence engaged in by Hindu deities against their ‘asuric’ opponents, who, if Dalit ideologues are to be believed, were none but their own ancestors, the original inhabitants of India. The entire chapter is a crude piece of propaganda that, reflecting apologetic Brahminical or Hindutva discourse, does not seriously engage with the Brahminical tradition while at the same time seeking to ardently defend it. Since the textbooks seem to be specifically geared to presenting an idealized image of Brahminical Hinduism in line with the view of modern neo-Brahminical or Hindutva apologists, they do not, of course, refer to the darker side of the Vedas, particularly the violence and hatred directed against the dark-skinned aboriginal peoples of India, references to which are found in abundance in the Vedas. As the noted historian David Lorenzen argues in his recent book, ‘Who Invented Hinduism?: Esays on Religion in History’ (Yoda Pres, New Delhi, 2006), Aryan or Vedic civilisation has little or no resemblance with the way it is portrayed in Hindu apologetic discourse. He writes that the Rig Veda is replete with negative references to the Dasas and Dasyus, the original inhabitants of India, progenitors of the Dalits and Adivasis of today, who are almost invariably described in lurid terms; as ‘worshippers of the male phallus’, ‘not sacrificing’, irreligious’, ‘without blessing’, ‘godless’, ‘bereft of the Vedas’ and so on. ‘Whatever the Dasa religion was’, Lorenzen says, ‘the Aryas clearly regarded it as inferior to their own’.

The Rig-Vedic Aryans were not opposed to the indigenous Indians on grounds of religious difference alone and the latter’s resistance to the Aryan sacrifice-based religion. Another grounds for opposition was skin colour. Lorenzen writes that the Rig Veda is replete with praises of various Aryan gods who are described as aiding the Aryans in their merciless slaughter of the non-Aryan dark-skinned original inhabitants of India. Thus, the Rig Veda [9.41.1] speaks of Soma as ‘killing the black skin’ and of ‘burn[ing] up the irreligious […] the dark skin that Indra hates’. It invokes the fire-god Agni and says, ‘From fear of you the dark tribes went in all directions, abandoning their possessions’ [7.5.3]. It talks of Indra helping the ‘sacrificing Arya’ by ‘punishing irreligious men and [making] subject to Manu the black skin’ [1.101.1]. It invokes Indra as he who ‘gives joy and, with Rjisvan, [who] killed the black offspring [or the black pregnant women]’. It specifically identifies Indra’s enemies as Dasyus and refers to Indra as ‘the Vrtra killer, the breaker of forts [who] tore to pieces female Dasas who had black vulvae’. The Rig Veda invokes Indra as he who ‘threw down the fifty thousand blacks and broke their forts as if [they were] old garments’ [4.13] and as he who ‘drove away the blacks’ and ‘killed the Dasas’ [6.47.21]. Indra is further lauded as one who ‘killed the noseless [or mouthless] Dasyus with [his] weapon’ [5.29.10], and ‘who, with his voice, killed many thousand inauspicious [women?] who had loud voices and spoke with disputatious speech’ [[10.235.5], this probably being a reference to speakers of non-Aryan indigenous languages. Analysing these and other Rig Vedic verses, Lorenzon argues that ‘the Rig Vedic evidence showing that the Arya warriors looked on themselves as conquerors, modeled on Indra and the Maruts, is simply overwhelming. To suggest, even indirectly, that their movement into South Asia consisted primarily of more or less peaceful, small-scale migrations (or even ‘infiltrations’) by bands much smaller than such tribes seems to me to be implausible and contrary to the evidence that exists’. ‘To make the Aryas into peaceful cowherds seems to me to imply that they followed some sort of pacifistic, Buddhist-like or Jain-like ideology, whereas the rig Veda clearly shows just the opposite. Arya men dedicated much of their lives to war a nd battle’. Hence, he insists, ‘the conclusion that several large-size Arya groups entered South Asia as invaders seems to be the only view that corresponds to the Vedas’. These darker aspects of Aryan culture and history are, of course, not referred to at all in the Rajasthan textbooks, which are geared to presenting the Vedic period as India’s ‘golden age’, which, as Lorenzen’s critique clearly indicates, is completely unwarranted. The invisibiliation of the Dalits, Adivasis and other oppressed castes in the textbooks is reflected not only in the glorification of Vedic culture but also in the almost total absence of any reference to these communities at all. There is not a single mention of the Dalits, and the only reference to Adivasis appears in the standard seven text, in a chapter titled ‘Rang Birangi Bharatiya Sanskriti’ (‘The Colourful Indian Culture’), which describes the Adivasis in terms of their alleged ‘exoticness’. Thus, it says, ‘in Nagaland, people put on masks depicting animals and birds and dance. In the North-East, there are thick rain forests […] and people here are short, flat-nosed and yellow in colour. Most of them live in tribes and love wearing colourful clothes’. This is also the only reference to North-East India in all the books. The same chapter also refers briefly to the Adivasis of Central and East India, saying, ‘Bihar has a large number of Adivasis as does Jharkhand. The Chhau dance here is famous and people dance wearing masks. Adivasi [men] wear dhotis till their knees and women wear saris [sic.]’.

As the textbooks appear to see it, the ‘low’ castes have not produced any heroes who are worth emulating. All the Hindu heroes mentioned in the books are ‘upper’ castes, including a number of Hindu kings and the founders of the various Hindu religious movements. Indian history is presented as the history of Hindu (and Muslim) rulers and other elites, with no mention at all of ‘ordinary’ people. The building of grand temples and palaces by various kings is elaborated upon in detail, but, expectedly, nothing at all issaid of the oppression that the ‘low’ castes had to suffer and through whose exploitation the entire cultural edifice that that the textbooks glorify was built. Likewise, the textbooks portray the Indian freedom struggle as the effort of ‘upper’ caste Hindu leaders, there being no mention whatsoever of Dalit, Adivasi, Shudra and Muslim freedom fighters. It is as if Gandhi and other ‘upper’ caste leaders of the Congress alone won India freedom from the British. In this silencing of the non-‘upper’ caste Hindu role in the freedom struggle, Dalit and Muslim leaders and organizations are portrayed in negative terms, as playing a divisive role and thereby working to strengthen British imperialism. Thus, the text meant for students of class nine describes the Muslim League as a British creation and identifies it as the sole cause of the mass violence in India immediately prior to the Partition. Muslim and Dalit critiques of the Congress as an ‘upper’ caste party, the significant Hindu supremacist element within the Congress, the consistent opposition of Hindu right-wing organizations, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Hindu Mahsabha, to the anti-imperialist struggle, their vociferous hatred of Muslims (and Dalits) and their active role in violence directed against Muslims are thus completely ignored. The only mention of non-‘upper’ caste figures in the context of the freedom struggle is a veiled negative reference to Babasaheb Ambedkar. It describes the decision by the British to grant separate electorates to Dalits in order to protect Dalit interests in 1932, but condemns this as ‘dividing the Hindus and the national movement’. It refers to Gandhi having persuaded Ambedkar to drop the demand for separate Dalit electorates, and, predictably, does not mention how the latter agreed to do this much against his will. Interestingly, this is the only mention of Ambedkar in all the texts.

The textbooks’ invisibilisation of the oppressed castes and, indeed, of such basic facts of Indian life as poverty, communal violence and caste discrimination, is evident in the way they deal with contemporary Indian society. Not a word is mentioned about the darker aspects of Indian reality. Instead, the textbooks present Indian society as prosperous, free of all contradictions and as marching towards peace and progress for all. Thus, the class six textbook talks of various social groups based on profession, describing this division of labour as working for the good of all, without even a hint of a mention of class or caste oppression. Defending the class system it simply asks, ‘If people associated with any profession stop working, imagine what difficulty we will face?’ The texts repeatedly refer to village and city life and make it a point to present the state as a benign institution, actively involved in promoting people’s welfare. That agencies of the state can do anything but this is thus ruled out completely. Thus, the textbooks deal in detail about various facilities provided, in theory, by the state for the public, presenting what is true in theory as true in practice as well. They mention various rights accorded to citizens by the Constitution without even mentioning the fact that for a very large section of the country’s population these remain only on paper and mean virtually nothing at all. They talk about the legislature, the judiciary and the police as being actively engaged in promoting people’s welfare, conflating principle with actual reality, and ignoring the active role of these institutions in sustaining the system of exploitation and oppression. Thus, for example, the standard seven text proclaims, ‘India is the biggest democracy in the world’ and this means that ‘the people are the rulers’ and that they elect their rulers who, in turn, ‘work for the public’ in ‘accordance with the Indian Constitution’. In turn, this means that ‘no one can be exploited and no one can be paid less than a proper wage’.

The textbooks even go to the extent of uncritically glorifying ‘globalisation’ and imperialism, which are playing such havoc with the livelihoods and lives of millions of Dalits, Adivasis and similar sections among other marginalized communities such as Muslims. Thus, the class nine textbook hails India’s close alliance with America, piously proclaiming that both countries ‘are democratic, committed to world peace, independence and respect for human rights […] Following the fall of the Soviet Union, the liberaleconomic policies have made relations between the two countries harmonious’. It further claims that ‘In the age of globalisation, due to its large area, population, huge middle class and economic potential, the USA has realized that India’s economic and political potential and democratic set-up cannot be ignored’. The devastating costs of ‘globalisation’ for millions of Dalits and other oppressed communities are thus carefully glossed over. The standard six textbook goes overboard in its enthusiasm for ‘globalization’, going so far as to claim a Hindu origin for it! Thus, it claims, ‘An important feature of Aryan society was the belief that all of humankind is one family and today that is expressed in the form of globalisation’. Rajasthan’s textbooks are not alone in their glorification of Brahminism, whitewashing its deep-rooted tradition of oppression, conflating it with Indian nationalism and invisibilising Dalits, Adivasis, Muslims and other marginalised communities.

It is likely that the same holds true in the case of texts used in many, if not most, Indian states. This urgently calls for organised efforts to critique the texts from a caste-class point of view and to buildpressure on the state to take appropriate measures.

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Copyright: Yoginder Sikand circulated in Yahoo Group

Gujar or State Violence?

Sixteen Gujars have been killed in a police firing that is being reported by state and media as “Gujar violence.” Some hundred lie in hospitals. Through the second day six bodies lie uncremated in open coffins with thousands gathered around them-a festering personal tragedy for family, clan and community. Forty eight hours after the event Vasundhara Raje refuses to heed what has become the near single demand of the community-to meet the Chief Minister. Paralysis seems to have gripped the administration of the leader depicted in a recent calendar as the goddess, Anapurna. With frequent resort to coercion this goddess seems hardly capable of nurturing her own people! 

In an instance of complete political and administrative failure the government of Rajasthan effectively converted what might have been legitimate democratic protest- articulating a claim to representation and reservation-into an angry mob burning public property. State failure lay in not only the excessive use of force, but in the failure to anticipate the huge mobilisation of Gujars from some five districts in Rajasthan. Were intelligence reports not forthcoming or did the bureaucracy-dependent mode of governance of the Raje administration ignore these? The movement focusing on the demand to include the Gujars in the Scheduled Tribe category had clearly been building up over the last year. The Rajasthan BJPs election manifesto had itself promised their “upgradation” from their current OBC status. 

The Gujar protest has many lessons for contemporary state and civil society. There is, first, the question of backwardness. Estimated at a total population of one crore and sixty lakhs throughout the country the Gujars are internally differentiated in terms of religion, occupation and socio-economic status. Historically they have been a hugely heterogenous group ranging from the Gurjar-Pratihara rulers from whom Gujarat derives its name to the Gujar Bakarwals nomads of Jammu and the Kashmir valley who are now mostly Sunni Muslim. There is said to have been a migration from Gujarat, Kathiawad and Rajasthan to Kashmir in the 6th-7th century and an earlier one from Georgia via Central Asia, Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan. In Uttaranchal they are referred to as the van Gujars because of their connection with the forests and in Rajasthan Gujar villages are found in the now National Parks of Sariska and Ranthambhor-from where they have been or are sought to be “resettled” (read displaced). 

The Gujar protest raises the larger question of the categories espoused by governmentality, colonial and postcolonial. Do they constitute a tribe or caste? In both Kashmir and Rajasthan the Gujars are cattle rearers, but have also been sedentarized over time. Should they be incorporated into the OBC or the Scheduled Tribe category? Under the eighteenth century revenue administration of eastern Rajasthan the Gujars were considered a peasant groups with a sudra status similar to the Minas, Meos, Jats, Ahirs. Nonetheless, folkloric sources indicate a more ambivalent status. In a Mewati epic a poor Gujar woman whose only cow is killed by a tiger weeps in the mountains until she is helped by Meo bandit-rebels. 

Another issue is the politics of inclusion into statist categories. In the aftermath of the formation of the state of Rajasthan the Minas were declared an ST group, but not the Gujars. The Minas had been an erstwhile ruling group of the Amber kingdom who were dispossessed by Rajputs much like the Bhil rajas elsewhere in Rajasthan and Gujarat. The Minas own internal categories of zamindari and chowkidari Minas suggest that they had evolved into a peasant group. The Amber/Jaipur kingdom gave the Minas a special status-their vermilion mark anointed the king and they guarded the treasury. The Gujars were treated as sudra group in the Mughal period and subject to a differential system of revenue assessment by the much expanded Jaipur kingdom. In eastern Rajasthan brahmins paid 12 pc, Rajputs 33 pc and raiyati groups such as Minas, Gujars, Jats and other up to 76 pc of the produce. 

During the colonial period a small section of the peasantry benefited including Jats who benefitted by the East Yamuna canal but other groups became increasingly desperate under pressure of high revenue assessment, famines and growing indebtedness. Gangs of Gujar, Mina, Mewati raiders became active from the late eighteenth century and through the early nineteenth century feeding into a discourse of para-criminality. The unrest of peasant-pastoral groups such as the Gujars and Mewatis fed into the making of the Revolt of 1857. 

The Gujar mobilisation then is multi-faceted. It is about legitimate democratic aspirations and citizenship. Like African American leaders of the Harlem Renaissance in the United States who were disheartened when their participation in the World War I only brought them more lynchings, Gujars contend that they contributed significantly to the anti-colonial struggle and to the Indian state. In the districts of Meerut, Bijnor, Alwar and Bharatpur they mobilised against the firangi in 1857, a contribution that brought them no advantage. Elsewhere I will have more to say on William Dalrymple’s construction of 1857 as the first jihad! 

The current protest is about entitlements in jobs and educational institutions and the perception that in the last fifty years Minas have forged way ahead of the Gujars. While the former have a high representation in the state and all India services, the latter have to resort to mining and construction labour and, at best, minor clerical jobs in the DDA. At its heart it is also about a model of economic growth that has not trickled down and a major failure of a neo-liberal model of development that seeks to establish glitzy SEZs, Filmcities, and emerald, gold and diamond souks but ignores the rural hinterland’s predicament of receding groundwater resources, low crop yields, and poverty. 

The unfortunate events of Dausa represent also the transformation of caste. Dumont’s description of the Indian as homo hierarchus in contrast to western man is homo aequalis clearly needs revisiting. Caste is about inequality, unequal ritual and social statuses and untouchability, but contemporary caste claims are also about homo aequalis and represent visions of justice and equality. Thus, while the earlier phase of lower caste assertion had been about displacing upper castes, a good deal of caste discourse is about challenging “creamy layers”. Satyanarayana Singh’s statement of 2003 represented the anxieties of Gujars, Ahirs, Malis and others that the Jats are cornering all the privileges for OBCs and everyone else is losing out. 

In the aftermath of this protest Gujar leaders will also require self-introspection. If the problem of the creamy layer bedevils Rajasthan’s overinflated OBC category, it is surely also the bane of the ST category where the marginality of the truly backward adivasis has only deepened with development. Surely more pan-Indian models such as the Yadav and Deshpande model of merit/handicap points ensuring exclusion of creamy layer within OBCS might ensure greater social justice. Further, will merely being listed as a ST ensure quality school education, better quality teaching and jobs? Finally, what are the gender imbalances that reservation might entail, specially given the experience of certain upwardly mobile individuals who keep their caste wife for the village and undertake inter-caste marriages in the city!

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@ Shail Mayaram, Senior Fellow, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, 29 Rajpur Road; Delhi 110054; shail@csdsdelhi.org;  Circulated to RAJASTHAN-STUDIES-GROUP, Wednesday, May 30, 2007